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Abstract 
Despite its status as one of the world’s leading emigration countries, empirical work on 
Morocco has been largely absent from the lively theoretical debate on migration and 
development. The social and economic impact of international migration on Moroccan 
migrant-sending regions is assessed here through a review of empirical studies. 
Notwithstanding empirical gaps and methodological flaws, available evidence suggests that 
migration and remittances have considerably improved living conditions, income, education 
and spurred economic activity through agricultural, real estate and business investment, from 
which non-migrants indirectly profit. This has transformed migrant-sending regions such as 
the Rif, Sous and southern oases into relatively prosperous areas that now attract internal 
‘reverse’ migrants. Although this challenges prevailing pessimism, the developmental 
potential of migration is not fully realized due to several structural constraints. Migration 
impacts are heterogeneous across space, socio-ethnic and gender groups, and tend to change 
over time and household migration cycles. Migration and remittances may enable people to 
retreat from, as much as to invest in, local economic activities, depending on the specific 
development context. Paradoxically, development in migrant-sending regions seems to be a 
prerequisite for return and investment rather than a consequence of migration.  
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Introduction1 
 
Over the past four decades, Morocco has evolved into an important country of emigration. 
Since the mid-1960s, Morocco has experienced large-scale migration of mostly unskilled 
migrants to western Europe. This migration was primarily oriented towards France, but also 
increasingly towards the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and, since the mid-1980s, Spain and 
Italy. The earlier expectation that these ‘guest workers’ would return home never materialized. 
Following the economic recession and the tightening of immigration policies after the 1973 
Oil Crisis, relatively few Moroccan migrants returned. Migrant networks, combined with a 
sustained demand for migrant labour, explain why policies aiming to curb migration have had 
only limited effects (cf. de Haas 2005a; 2005b).  
 
Moroccans form not only one of the largest, but also one of the most dispersed migrant 
communities in Western Europe. Out of a total population of 30 million, over 3 million people 
of Moroccan descent lived abroad in 2004. The actual number may be higher, due to 
undocumented migration. Moreover, this does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of 
Moroccan descent living in Israel. France is home to the largest legally residing population of 
Moroccan descent (more than 1,105,000), followed by Spain (424,,000), the Netherlands 
(300,000), Italy (299,000), Belgium (293,000), and Germany (102,000). Smaller communities 
live in Scandinavian countries (17,000), the United Kingdom (50,000), the United States 
(100,000), and Canada (70,000) (de Haas 2005a; Fargues 2005). 
 
                                                 
1
 Data and literature collection by the author in Morocco was part of the 1998-2001 IMAROM research project, 
which was funded by the INCO-DC programme of the European Commission (DG XII, IC18-CT97-0134) and 
coordinated by the University of Amsterdam (see De Haas 2001). Subsequent funding, which enabled this 
review, was provided by a postdoctoral research grant (2003-2006, W 53-331) of the Netherlands Foundation for 
the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research 
(NWO). The author wishes to express his gratitude to these funding bodies for enabling this study. An earlier 
version of this paper was presented at the New Moroccan Migrations Conference, 13-14 July 2005, Sussex 
University. The author thanks Oliver Bakewell and Stephen Castles (University of Oxford) for their valuable 
comments on an earlier draft.  
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Map 1. Main zones of international out-migration in Morocco  
  
 
There are distinct patterns of spatial clustering and specialisation in migration, resulting in a 
concentration of migration from particular sending regions within Morocco towards specific 
countries, regions and even cities within Europe (cf. Ben Ali 1996:348). Highly marginalized 
regions participated less in migration than the relatively opened up ‘migration belts’ with 
established traditions of pre-modern, largely circular migration (de Haas 2005a). On the basis 
of migration participation data at the provincial level (Refass 1990:228), it is possible to 
distinguish three principal Moroccan migration belts: The eastern part of the Rif mountain 
area, the southwestern Sous region near Agadir and the river oases located southeast of the 
High Atlas. In particular since the 1990s, in response to new labour opportunities in southern 
Europe, a spatial diffusion of international out-migration has occurred beyond the historical 
migration belts to regions that used to be predominantly oriented towards internal migration 
(Bencherifa 1996), such as Khenifra in the Middle Atlas (to Italy and Spain), the region of 
Laârache south of Tangiers (to Spain and the United Kingdom) and the Tadla plain south of 
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Khouribga (to Italy) (de Haas 2005a; Fadloullah et al. 2000:51-52,99-100; Refass 1999:100) 
(see Map 1). 
 
In contrast to earlier predictions, migrant remittances from Europe to Morocco have shown an 
upward trend over the past decades (see figure 1). Receiving $4.2 billion in official 
remittances in 2004, Morocco was the fifth largest remittance receiver in the developing 
world, and the largest remittances receiver in per capita terms. The inflow of hard currency 
remittances is crucial to the balance of payments. While remittances represented 6.4 percent of 
Morocco’s GNP over the 1990s on average, they represented 20.1 percent of all imports in 
goods and services. In 2001, remittances were six times higher than official development aid, 
five times higher than FDI, and also exceeded revenues from tourism and the export of 
agricultural produce and phosphates (de Haas and Plug 2006). 
 
Figure 1. Volume of official remittance, ODA, and FDI flows to Morocco 
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The so-called “Euro effect” and concomitant money laundering can only explain part of the 
recent surge in remittances. The structural solidity of remittances is explained by the 
unforeseen persistence of migration to northwestern Europe; new labour migration towards 
southern Europe; and the durability of transnational and transgenerational links between 
migrants and ‘stay behinds’. The stable economic-political environment and new policies 
 6  
towards migrants explain why Morocco has been relatively successful in channelling 
remittances through official channels (de Haas and Plug 2006). 
 
It has often been feared that this increase in income is artificial and temporary and therefore 
creates a dangerous dependency on external sources of income (cf. Aït Hamza, 1988; Mter, 
1995; Kagermeier, 1997; Lazaar, 1989). However, empirical evidence indicates that 
remittances are a comparatively stable, less volatile and countercyclical source of income and 
that the relation between migration duration and remittances is not linear. In fact, remittances 
tend to increase in the first two decades after migration, and the subsequent ‘remittance decay’ 
is more delayed and the slope of this decline is much flatter than previously assumed (de Haas 
and Plug, 2006). According to a 1988 study undertaken in France, 29 percent of the second 
generation ‘Moroccans’ abroad remit regularly (Collyer, 2004). Interpretation of this figure is 
ambiguous. Collyer (ibid, p. 19) observed that, although this can be a cause for disquietude, 
“it does nonetheless suggest a significant degree of continued contact of the second 
generation”.  
 
Notwithstanding the macro-economic significance of remittances and incomes of migrants’ 
families, the extent to which international migration and remittances can bring about more 
long-term, sustained development and economic growth in migrant-sending areas in poor 
countries is quite a different question. This very issue has been the subject of intensive debate 
over the past decades, in which the more pessimistic views have tended to dominate.  
 
Up to the 1960s especially, developmentalist ‘migration optimists’ argued that migration and 
the flow of remittances, as well as the experience, skills and knowledge of returning migrants 
would help sending regions in developing countries in their economic take-off (Penninx 1982, 
782–3; cf. Beijer, 1970). In recent years, this optimistic developmentalist view of migration, 
remittances and development seems to be experiencing a remarkably renaissance (cf. Kapur, 
2003; Ratha 2003; World Bank 2006). 
 
On the other hand, ‘migration pessimists’— inspired by the structuralist paradigm and 
dependency theory — have argued that migration and concomitant changes, such as growing 
inequality and individualism, lead to the breakdown of traditional, stable communities and 
regional economies, leading in turn to the development of passive, non-productive 
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communities, which become increasingly dependent on remittances. The latter are said to be 
spent mainly on luxury goods and ‘consumer’ investments, and rarely invested in productive 
enterprises. In a process known as cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957), migration is claimed 
to undermine the local economy by depriving communities of their valuable labour force. 
South-North migration is perceived as discouraging the autonomous economic growth of 
migrant-sending countries (Lipton, 1980; cf. Rahman, 2000; Rubenstein, 1992).  
 
However, both approaches seemed to be too rigid and determinist to deal with the complex 
realities of migration and development interactions. In the 1980s and 1990s, the new 
economics of labour migration (NELM) emerged in American research as a response to both 
functionalist-developmentalist (the ‘migration optimists’) and structuralist migration and 
development theory (the ‘migration pessimists’). Stark (1978; 1991), in particular, revitalized 
academic thinking on migration from the developing world, by placing the behaviour of 
individual migrants within a wider societal context and considering the household — rather 
than the individual — as the most appropriate decision-making unit (cf. Taylor, 1999). This 
approach models migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households. Migration is 
perceived as a household response to income risks, since remittances serve as income 
insurance for households in the country of origin. In addition, migration is ascribed a vital role 
in providing a potential source of investment capital, which is especially important in the 
context of the imperfect credit (capital) and risk (insurance) markets prevailing in most 
developing countries (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999). Migration can, therefore, also be a strategy 
to overcome various market constraints, enabling households to invest in productive activities 
and to durably improve their livelihoods.  
 
A growing body of more recent empirical work strongly suggests that the developmental 
impacts of migration are often far more positive than is commonly assumed. Several studies 
have shown that migrant households tend to have a higher propensity to invest than do non-
migrant households, but also that consumption and often trivialized ‘non-productive’ 
investments can have positive income-multiplier effects, through which the benefits or 
remittances might also indirectly accrue to non-migrant households (for outstanding reviews, 
see Taylor et al., 1996a and 1996b; reprinted in revised versions in Massey et al. 1998; see 
also Özden and Schiff 2005).  
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However, there is a striking absence in this debate of micro and meso-level empirical work on 
the major source countries of European-bound labour migration south and east of the 
Mediterranean (cf. Massey et al., 1998). Recent theoretical insights on migration and 
development are almost uniquely based on micro-studies done in Latin America, particularly 
Mexico. Because of this bias, it is unclear to what extent actual migration impacts in migrant-
sending areas outside the Western Hemisphere do correspond with these findings. 
 
This certainly applies to Morocco, where the systematic study of migration and development 
has been relatively neglected after a temporary surge of largely pessimistic studies in the 
1970s, while the Moroccan migration and development context and the theoretical debate 
have radically changed since then. Detailed empirical studies that have been conducted tend to 
be exclusively descriptive and theoretically disconnected, and are therefore generally not 
designed to test theoretically derived hypotheses on migration impacts. Moreover, most 
empirical work on Moroccan migration impacts is written in French2, and often consists of 
unpublished reports, theses or working papers, or is published in the form of conference 
proceedings, books or in journals with a very limited distribution. Consequently, existing 
empirical work has remained largely unknown and theoretically underexplored, in particular, 
outside the French-speaking world. It is striking in this respect that recent attempts by 
Leichtman (2002), Nyberg-Sørensen (2004) and Gallina (2006) to address migration and 
development interactions in Morocco at the regional level have ignored most prior empirical 
work. The striking result is that (predominantly francophone) empirical work from a prime 
emigration country like Morocco has been absent from the (predominantly Anglophone) 
theoretical debate on migration and development. 
 
The aim of this paper is to establish such a link for Morocco through reviewing a substantial 
part of the empirical literature on the effects of international migration on social and economic 
                                                 
2
 In fact, English is presumably only the fifth language of publication on Moroccan migration impacts, after 
French, German, Dutch and Arabic. This seems to primarily reflect the fact that relatively few Moroccan 
migrants live in the Anglo-Saxon world. In particular Moroccan-German and Moroccan-Dutch research teams 
have been relatively active in studying regional migration impacts. Whereas most Anglophone researchers seem 
unaware of most francophone empirical studies, most Francophone or Arabophone researchers seem largely 
unaware of the theoretical debate on migration and development conducted in predominantly Anglophone 
academic journals.  
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development in Moroccan-migrant-sending regions and the communities they contain. The 
analysis also aims to assess how this empirical evidence relates to the general theoretical 
debate on migration and development. However, we do not pretend to be comprehensive, 
since existing evidence is patchy. Therefore, the final aim of the analysis is to identify 
empirical lacunae.  
 
 
Remittances, income and living conditions 
 
A recent survey revealed that 94 percent of 1,239 migrants who were interviewed during their 
holiday in Morocco said they had remitted money to Morocco during the 5 years covered by 
the survey and sixty percent reported that they had transferred at least one quarter of their 
income (Hamdouch, 2000). However, this survey is likely to be biased because only migrants 
visiting Morocco were interviewed. In 2000, migrants in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, Spain and Italy remitted an average of 10,740 Moroccan dirham (approximately  
1,000) per year to Morocco (de Haas and Plug, 2006). This included children and the inactive 
population. At the household level, this implies that remittances per remitting migrant reach 
higher levels. A recent survey in south Morocco revealed that the average remittance-
receiving household received 32,000 dirham (approximately  3,000) annually (de Haas, 
2003). Much money is handed over personally and migrants take many goods (e.g., 
electronics, household appliances, furniture, cars, car spare parts and clothes) to Morocco as 
gifts or as merchandise (Refass 1999). Remittances in kind have been estimated at levels of 
25-33 (Refass, 1999) and 30-50 percent (Khachani, 2002) of money transfers. 
 
There is some macro-economic evidence that the inflow of remittances substantially 
contributes to income growth (cf. Testas, 2002). Teto (2001) projected that 1.17 million out of 
30 million Moroccans would fall back to absolute poverty without international remittances, 
and the proportion living below the poverty line would increase from 19.0 to 23.2 percent.3 
The actual contribution of migration to income growth and poverty alleviation is likely to be 
higher, as this study only considered official remittances and ignored the income multiplier 
                                                 
3
 In urban environments this increase would be from 12.0 to 16.6 percent, and in rural environments from 27.2 to 
31.0 percent.  
 10  
effects of remittance expenditure. However, the middle and higher income classes profit 
relatively more from remittances than the lowest income groups (Teto, 2001), because 
migration itself has proved to be a selective process, and most Moroccan migrants therefore 
do not belong to the poorest groups (Schiff, 1994, p. 15) 
 
In regions with high international out-migration, the contribution to income growth can be far 
higher. In several communities in Morocco’s three main migration belts — the Rif Mountains, 
the Sous valley and southern oases (de Haas, 2005a) — between one fifth to over a half of all 
households have at least one member who has migrated abroad (de Haas, 2003; Schoorl et al., 
2000, p. xv). De Haas (2003) found that the average international migrant household’s income 
was 2.5 times higher than the non-migrant household’s income, and that this was largely the 
effect of remittances. International migration is a highly effective way of enormously 
improving the financial situation and living conditions of households (de Haas, 2003; 
Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xx).  
 
It is a common assumption that migrants will become less inclined to remit with integration, 
family reunification and diminishing family obligations. However, as has been mentioned 
before, remittances have been proven to be more stable than was previously assumed. 
Remittances tend initially to increase with migration duration and the size of the household 
left behind, although they tend to decrease after family reunification (Fadloullah et al., 2000, 
p. xix)4. One study conducted in France found that remittances reached their peak between 3 
and 12 years after initial migration (Garson and Tapinos, 1981). A study on the trend of 
remittances per migrant head from northwest European countries revealed a peak around 
1990, more than two decades after the onset of large-scale migration (De Haas and Plug, 
2004). This is in line with other evidence that individual remittances tend to reach a peak 
approximately two decades after migration (Fokkema and Groenewold, 2003).  
 
Transnational bonds are more durable than previously assumed (cf. Saa, 1998), and sending 
communities continuously renew the remittance potential through migration (De Haas, 2003). 
Moreover, migrants’ social and, in particular, economic integration actually tends to lead to an 
                                                 
4
 Interestingly, the same study revealed that two-fifths of migrant households do not receive remittances 
(Fadloullah, 2000, p. 121). 
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increased capacity to remit (Chattou 1998). Remittances tend to increase with the income of 
the migrant (Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xix). On the basis of a survey conducted in Turkey, 
Morocco and Egypt, Fokkema and Groenewold (2003) concluded that employed migrants 
remit four times more than unemployed migrants. For instance, the surge in remittances from 
the Netherlands in the late 1990s can probably be attributed to a significant decrease in 
unemployment among Moroccan migrants (De Haas and Plug, 2006). The massive yearly 
return during the summer holiday5 and the fact that second generation immigrants marry 
spouses living in Morocco reveals the relative durability of transnational ties.  
 
Migrants’ attachment to sending communities is also testified by the establishment of many 
‘home town’ associations and development NGOs by migrants. Such ‘development networks’ 
(Lacroix, 2005) play an increasingly important role in sending regions through the 
establishment of public infrastructure (road construction, electricity, drinking water, irrigation 
systems, mills, dams, etc), social development projects (community centers, literacy projects, 
schools and dormitories, mosques, etc), and, more recently, projects aimed at improving local 
economies (workshops, women’s cooperatives, handicrafts, vegetable oil and milk production, 
tourist development, etc.) (Lacroix, 2005; see also Gallina, 2004). The freedom of activities of 
migrants’ associations used to be very restricted until recently, certainly compared with 
countries like Mexico and Turkey. However, increasing civil liberties in Morocco over the 
1990s have led to a remarkable increase in association activities.  
 
 
Demographic effects 
 
The effect of migration on decreasing population growth or unemployment at the national 
level should not be overestimated. Migration is too limited a phenomenon to counter general 
demographic trends, although demographic effects of migration are often magnified at a 
regional and local level. Large-scale out-migration of young people and subsequent family 
migration may cause a considerable slow down in demographic growth at those levels 
(Kerbout, 1990). Nevertheless, the commonly employed metaphor exode rurale to indicate 
                                                 
5
 According to Fadloullah et al. (2000), three quarters of the international migrants had visited Morocco at least 
once in the two years prior to the survey.  
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this process is misleading, as it may evoke an image of absolute rural depopulation, which 
occurs only in specific, isolated, mostly mountainous or desert areas (cf. De Haas, 1998). 
Most emigration regions have, instead, witnessed a net population increase (cf. Koubry, 
1995). Moreover, where depopulation occurs, it seems to be the result of internal migration. 
International migration and remittances rather enable family members to stay in the village, 
and several authors have argued that it has prevented the depopulation of regions such as the 
Rif, Anti-Atlas and the southern oases (De Mas, 1990; Fadloullah et al., 2000; Heinemeijer et 
al., 1976; Mter, 1995). Moreover, as we shall see, the long-term direct and indirect effects of 
remittance expenditure can even lead to an increase in population through reverse migration.  
 
 
Migration, consumption and investments 
 
As in the international literature, pessimism has long pervaded the Moroccan literature on the 
development impacts of international migration. It is generally believed that remittances are 
primarily used for daily expenses, conspicuous consumption and ‘non-productive’ 
investments, such as the construction of palatial houses, which spur inflation and do not create 
employment. Productive investment in agriculture or industry, by contrast, is claimed to be 
very limited. In many instances, it is argued, migrant households even withdraw from 
productive activities in and outside agriculture. This is believed to lead to a dangerous, 
passive dependency on remittance income (cf. Fadloullah et al., 2000; Hamdouch et al., 1979; 
Lazaar, 1987; Kagermeier, 1997; Mezdour, 1993; Seddon 1981).  
 
However, the empirical and analytical basis of such assertions seems to be rather weak. 
Firstly, the vast majority of studies only address migrants and do not include non-migrants and 
their households in research populations. The lack of systematic comparisons between migrant 
and non-migrant households makes it difficult to assess properly the impact of migration on 
the economic status and consumption and investment patterns of households. Secondly, 
virtually all studies ignore the analytical implications of the fungible nature of household 
income. Because the diverse sources of household income are typically pooled in the common 
household budget, it is not possible to earmark remittances (cf. Taylor, 1999). This makes 
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common assertions such as “remittances are spent on x, y, or z….”, difficult to sustain.6 
Thirdly, impact studies tend to concentrate on remittances and migrants’ activities and do not 
consider other sources of household income. Nevertheless, remittances and income from other 
sources are likely to affect each other reciprocally, whether income is pooled or not. 
Therefore, all activities of households should be taken into consideration — the ‘whole 
household approach’ advocated by Taylor (1999) — in order to assess properly the impact of 
migration.  
 
Furthermore, claims that remittances are mostly used for conspicuous consumption (e.g., 
luxury houses, videos, television, satellite dishes, cars) are often not based on any attempt at 
systematic data collection at all (cf. Aït Hamza, 1988; Kagermeier, 1997). They tend to be 
based on general impressions, which however typically tend to record only the most visible 
type of —status-related — expenditures such as cars and palatial houses. They are likely to 
ignore or underestimate other, less visible, but necessarily not less important, consumption 
and investments. Subsequently, assertions that migrants spend their money “irrationally” (cf. 
Aït Hamza, 1988) on luxury goods and non-productive investments can become truths in 
themselves, as they are hardly subjected to sound empirical verification.  
 
Nevertheless, if we look at the pertinent empirical data that is available, a considerably more 
positive picture arises. In the 1970s, Heinemeijer et al. (1976) already concluded on the basis 
a large-scale survey in two main migrant-sending areas (the Rif and the Sous) that migrants 
actually had a relatively high propensity to invest, although the unfavourable and uncertain 
economic conditions limited investment opportunities (see also Bonnet and Bossard, 1973). 
More recent studies have also indicated that migrants do not indulge in conspicuous 
consumption and that they are more prone to invest in non-housing sectors of the local 
economy – the service sector in particular – than was previously assumed (de Haas, 2003; 
Khachani, 1998; Refass, 1999). 
 
A recent survey claimed that over 70 percent of migrants had invested in Morocco 
(Hamdouch, 2000), although this figure is probably biased towards the more involved 
                                                 
6
 This problem already starts with questionnaire design. Migration impact surveys typically contain questions 
such as “Would you tell me in which ways the money you received from family, relatives and friends [….] was 
spent” (this was a question in a recent Eurostat/NIDI survey; cf. Schoorl et al., 2000). 
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migrants, because only migrants on holiday in Morocco were interviewed. McMurray (1992, 
cited in Nyberg-Sørensen 2004) found that 41 percent of return migrants in Nador entered 
commerce, services or transportation. 12 percent were business owners or independent 
operators before migration, against 39 percent after return. From his survey, de Haas (2003) 
concluded that, between 1975 and 1999, 43 percent of return migrants as against 15 percent of 
non-migrants invested in agricultural water pumps; 29 percent as against 9 percent bought 
agricultural land; 88 as against 54 percent invested in real estate; and 39 as against 13 percent 
invested in non-agricultural enterprises. On average, current and returned international 
migrant households invested four and six times more, respectively, than non-migrant 
households.  
 
Khachani (1998) argued that there has been a diversification in the economic activities of 
Moroccan migrants. In several migrant-sending communities, remittances not only enable 
migrants’ households to construct modern houses, but also permit the purchase of agricultural 
land and modern agricultural equipment, the introduction of state-of-the-art stock-raising, or 
the establishment of non-agricultural enterprises, such as those in the tourist sector, and the 
setting up of commercial establishments and small and medium-size industries in food-
processing and the supply of building materials (cf. Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004; cf. Bencherifa 
and Popp, 1990; 2000). Migrants are also said to have played a significant role in activating 
the stock exchange in Casablanca and are managing parts of the privatized transportation 
system, such as bus services (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004).  
 
Most studies do not systematically compare the consumption and investment behaviour of 
migrants and non-migrant households, and it is often unclear to what extent the relative 
propensity to invest in particular sectors is higher or lower among migrant households. 
Nevertheless, in the following sections we will formulate some hypotheses on the basis of 
existing empirical research. 
 
 
Migration and real estate investments 
 
Unsurprisingly, literally all studies agree that housing construction is the migrants’ first 
investment priority (cf. Fellat, 1996). Hamdouch (2000) concluded that 83.7 percent of all 
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migrants’ investment projects were in real estate, as against 7.5 and 8.8 percent in agriculture 
and other sectors, respectively. De Haas (2003) concluded that 71.1 percent of the total 
monetary sum of investments by households in his sample was in real estate, 11.3 percent in 
agriculture and 17.5 percent in non-agricultural enterprises. The most visible spatial effect of 
international migration is the construction of new, often concrete houses and the related 
decline of the traditional, adobe or stone, dwellings. In migrant-sending areas throughout 
Morocco, this building fever has transformed certain villages into towns, where migrants also 
prefer to locate other investments (Fadloullah et al., 2000).  
 
The majority of researchers lament the migrants’ priority for real estate investments. The size 
and self-indulgent style of migrants’ houses is generally frowned upon. Both scholars and 
policy makers have tended to strongly disapprove of what Kaioua (1999, p. 124) dismissed as 
a “mentalité de pierre” (stone mentality). They almost seem to accuse7 international migrants 
of building large, richly-ornamented houses in an urban style which has been considered as 
“exaggerated” (Ben Ali, 1996, p. 354), reflecting an “irrational” (Aït Hamza, 1988) use of 
money for unnecessary status symbols. The lack of entrepreneurial mentality among migrants 
is often blamed for this orientation towards what Kaioua (1999, p. 124) called a “refuge sector 
par excellence”. This discourse is typically accompanied by a call on policies to “divert 
remittances to productive sectors of the economy” (Agoumy, 1988, p. 159) by “guiding” 
migrants towards more “rational” investment behaviour (Kaioua, 1999, p. 124).  
 
However, there seems to be ample reason to criticize this attitude as rather patronizing, for 
blaming migrants’ irrational mentality a priori rather than trying to comprehend their motives. 
Houses do indeed function as a status symbol, expressing the upward social mobility achieved 
through migration (Mezdour, 1993, p. 182).8 However, besides the fact that they tend to fulfil 
                                                 
7
 In this context, Taylor et al. (1996a:411) spoke of “diatribes by academics and policy makers against migrants 
for their profligate and unproductive ways”. 
8
 Berriane (1997) and De Haas (2003) argued that the luxury of migrants’ houses is often exaggerated. Only a 
minority of the houses are built in a truly pompous style, whereas many houses are relatively modest in size and 
style. Unfortunately, such palatial houses tend to be taken as a stereotypical, representative example for migrants’ 
houses, because they are located along paved roads and catch the eye. In fact, this is a distorted, deductive, and 
self-affirmative view typical of non-systematic, impressionistic “research” based on superficial impressions (for 
similar criticism, see Taylor, 1999). 
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this function in virtually all societies, it appears to be erroneous to reduce the desire to 
construct houses as simply a quest to erect status symbols.  
 
The importance attached to housing should primarily be explained by the universal quest for 
space, safety, privacy, fewer conflicts and better health. Hajjarabi (1988) has pointed to the 
legitimacy of the desire for convenient living and basic hygienic facilities. The first objective 
of migrants is to meet the household’s immediate needs through providing them with proper 
nutrition, health care, clothing and housing. The relatively large, new houses and the 
sanitation and other equipment they tend to contain can offer more convenient living, privacy 
and safety9 than was conceivable in traditional dwellings. Dismissing such aspects of well-
being as ‘non-developmental’ reflects a particularly narrow view of development. In fact, by 
suggesting that rural people should stay in their mud brick houses, wealthy and urban-based 
social scientists apply different standards to others than they would probably do for 
themselves. 
 
Secondly, there are specific social and cultural reasons that explain the priority for housing 
construction. In extended families remittances are seldom sent directly to the migrant’s wife, 
but generally to one of the men within the household (Hajjarabi, 1988, p. 180-1). 
Traditionally, the in-laws decide on the use of remittances. This situation is widely known to 
generate numerous conflicts between migrants’ wives and their in-laws (De Mas, 1990; 
Hajjarabi, 1995, p. 107). Hajjarabi (1988, p. 182-3) argued that, because they expect to gain 
significantly in personal liberty and privacy, the wish to have one’s own house — away from 
the authority of their parents-in-law — is a top priority among women (cf. Van Rooij, 2000).  
 
This creates a push for migrants’ nuclear families to establish their own households by 
constructing a new house either in the native village or in nearby towns. Besides increasing 
the personal liberty of migrant wives, this can also be an effective strategy for migrants to 
escape from the heavy financial burden of supporting large extended families. Such 
disaggregation, in which intra-household tensions about remittance use accelerate the break-
up of extended families, the nucleation of family life and the physical ‘lifting out’ of nuclear 
                                                 
9
 In the event of earthquakes or floods, the traditional (adobe) habitat can also be dangerous to live in because of 
the risk of collapse. Most of the damaged or collapsed houses during the 2004 earthquake in Al Hoceima, 
northern Morocco, were traditional dwellings. Most concrete structures survived the earthquake.  
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families, has been observed in several migrant-sending areas (Aït Hamza, 1988; 1995; 
Berriane, 1996; de Haas, 2003; De Mas, 1990).  
 
Thirdly, housing also turns out to be a rational, relatively secure capital investment through 
which households are able to generate additional income through various lease arrangements. 
Second and third houses are generally built in nearby towns and cities. Taking into account 
high population increase, the nucleation of family life, fast urban growth and the concomitant 
large demand for housing (Dhonte et al., 2000), real estate investments can be a highly 
rewarding investment strategy, which potentially enables migrant households to secure and 
increase income. Moreover, house ownership provides ‘life insurance’ for the migrants’ 
households (de Haas, 2003).  
 
Thus, the high priority for housing seems to be rational, because it is a relatively low-risk 
investment in an insecure investment environment, which increases wellbeing and has 
potentially high benefits (cf. Ben Ali, 1996, p. 360). Because of sustained population growth, 
urbanization and the general process of household nucleation there is a persistent scarcity on 
the urban housing market (cf. Dhonte et al., 2000). Construction has become one of the pillars 
of the Moroccan economy, not least because of migrants’ investments (Charef, 1986). 
Moreover, as we will see, real estate investments have had important, indirect positive 
economic effects in creating local and regional employment opportunities.  
 
 
Migration and agricultural transformations 
 
It has been commonly argued in the Moroccan literature that international migration has 
contributed to agricultural decline and a general disaffection with small-scale peasant 
agriculture. The ‘lost labour’ of able-bodied (migrated) men is ascribed a key role in the 
process of agricultural decline. The exode rurale is supposed to have led to agricultural 
decline or even abandonment of agriculture (De Mas, 1990; Ferry and Toutain, 1990; 
Kerbout, 1990, p. 55). Instead of investing, it has been argued that migrant households tend to 
withdraw partially or entirely from agriculture. Return migrants who do invest in agriculture 
often do so, not out of rational economic motives, but because of their strong emotional 
attachment towards agriculture. It would therefore concern a “ritual” (De Mas, 1990) or 
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“sentimental” (Bencherifa, 1991) agriculture, in which the migrant practices a kind of “hobby 
farming” (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000, p. 142).  
 
However, this pessimistic perspective is fundamentally challenged by an increasing number of 
empirical studies showing that international remittances have played a key role in facilitating 
agricultural investments. As long ago as the early 1970s, Bonnet and Bossard (1973, p. 19) 
observed that remittances had made possible intensification of agriculture in the Sous region. 
In other migrant-sending regions, too, migrants play an important and innovative role in the 
development of subsistence and commercial agriculture through the purchase of land, modern 
agricultural equipment, such as tractors and water pumps, the introduction of new crops and 
techniques and the establishment of new farms. Migrants show a particular preference for 
investments in the development of new irrigated agriculture (Bencherifa, 1991; 1993; 
Bencherifa and Popp, 1990; 2000; de Haas, 2001; Popp, 1999). Pascon (1985) observed that 
investments by international migrants in wells and water pumps have mitigated the effects of 
the severe drought occurring in the mid-1970s. 
 
This apparent contradiction in the literature can be partly resolved by comprehending that 
migration impacts are not uniform across time and space. There are indications that the initial 
effect of migration on agricultural productivity might indeed have been negative, because of 
an acute lack of family labour. This sometimes went along with a relative degradation of the 
agricultural infrastructure and in particular if irrigation systems. However, in the longer term, 
and after an adjustment process, this agricultural decline has often been reversed through 
agricultural investments made possible by the inflow of remittances (de Haas, 2001). While 
current migrant households sometimes de-intensify agriculture, return migrants can play an 
innovative and production-increasing role in agriculture (Bencherifa, 1996, p. 416-422; 
Bencherifa and Popp, 1990, p. 97).  
 
This exemplifies the importance of inter-temporal dimensions in the assessment of migration 
impacts. A focus on short-term effects of international migration might therefore partly 
explain the overly pessimistic conclusions of prior research. A more fundamental weakness of 
the ‘lost labour hypothesis’ is, however, its ignorance of the possibility that the migrants’ 
labour — if it creates absolute shortages at all — can be substituted by household members, 
sharecroppers, remunerated non-migrant or immigrant workers and, partially, mechanization. 
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It seems that, after a period of decline and change from subsistence, labour-intensive towards 
more capital-intensive forms of agriculture, such substitution is indeed occurring in several 
migrant-sending regions.  
 
It should be emphasized, however, that migration does not automatically lead to agricultural 
development or other investments and, in fact, the long-term impact of migration on 
agricultural development in Morocco is characterized by a high degree of spatial 
differentiation. Drawing on Bencherifa’s (1991) seminal work, we can hypothesize the 
following patterns: regions where arable land is relatively abundant and plot sizes large, where 
irrigation water is available in sufficient quantities and which are located near to roads and 
other public infrastructures, often attract the investments of international migrants – and in 
fact of entrepreneurs in general. Where water availability is uncertain or costly and other 
decisive factors obstruct agricultural production and family life — such as uncertain land 
property rights, complex collective regulations concerning maintenance and water 
distribution, extremely small plot sizes — migrants tend to be far less inclined to invest in 
agriculture or might even partially withdraw from that sector (see also Bencherifa and Popp, 
2000, pp. 141-3; de Haas, 2001).  
 
It is not uncommon for migrants originating from ecologically marginal areas (e.g., semi-arid 
mountains or certain oases) to allocate agricultural investments in more favourable 
environments, such as more fertile coastal or alluvial plains. Farmers prefer to localize new 
investments in desert areas outside the traditional oases, where land is abundantly available in 
contrast to the microscopic land tenure systems in the old oases, and where constraints arising 
from the complex and inflexible collective regulations concerning water distribution and 
maintenance of the agricultural infrastructure do not play a role (cf. Bencherifa, 1991, pp. 132-
4l; de Haas, 2003). 
 
Besides geographical and ecological factors, the availability of public services and 
infrastructure (e.g., paved roads, electricity, drinking water, schools) appear to be highly 
important factors determining the attraction of rural regions for investments in general (Popp, 
1999, p. 194). Isolation and the absence of basic public amenities – to which migrants in 
particular have become accustomed – are major obstacles to resettlement and investments in 
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the region of origin. Where this is the case, migrants appear to prefer settling in nearby urban 
centres (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000, p. 143).  
 
Finally, it is important to differentiate between the impacts of internal and international 
migration. There is evidence that, especially in areas where irrigation is relatively costly or 
labour-intensive, internal migration is associated with agricultural stagnation or decline 
(Bencherifa, 1996, p. 417; de Haas, 1998). The relatively low incomes of internal migrants 
often do not allow for lost labour substitution. In arid and semi-arid areas where irrigation 
water is accessible only through pumping, such as in several oases, internal and non-migrant 
households can even be forced to withdraw from agriculture if they cannot afford to invest in 
digging wells and buying water pumps. It is internal migration, therefore, rather than 
international migration, that seems to be associated with a retreat from agriculture through the 
decreased availability of family labour and poverty (de Haas, 1998; 2003).  
 
 
Livelihood diversification, non-agricultural investments and intertemporal shifts 
 
Notwithstanding substantial agricultural investments by migrants, the relative economic 
importance of agriculture has decreased through a general diversification in rural livelihoods 
(Bencherifa and Popp, 2000; Berriane, 1997). Exclusively agricultural-based households are 
becoming an increasingly exceptional phenomenon. In large parts of semi-arid and arid 
Morocco, for example in the Anti-Atlas, the central and eastern Rif and southern oases, 
agricultural activities have become an activity of secondary economic importance (Bencherifa 
and Popp, 1990, p. 101; De Mas, 1990; Mter, 1995). Only 4.3 percent of the ‘rural’ 
households surveyed by de Haas (2003) relied exclusively on agriculture. Such livelihood 
diversification is partly realized through migration, although the rural economies themselves 
are also becoming less agricultural and urbanizing, with increasing employment in non-
agricultural sectors, such as retail trade, commerce, cafes and hotels, crafts etc.  
 
This process of intra-regional urbanization and livelihood diversification seems to be 
associated with and reinforced by shifting investment priorities among migrants. Investments 
in all kinds of service enterprises, ranging from grocery stores, commerce, coffee houses, 
hotels, travel agencies, restaurants, money changers, to transportation (taxis, vans, buses) have 
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become relatively more important to the detriment of real estate and, particularly, agricultural 
investments (cf. Berriane, 1996; 1997; Lazaar, 1987). Migrants have also played an important 
role in the growth of small-scale industry. Whereas, in the 1970s, the vast majority of 
investment projects was in agriculture (cf. Heinemeijer et al., 1976), Hamdouch (2000) found 
that the tertiary sector has become the privileged target sector among international migrants, 
accounting for 44.8 percent of intended investment projects — 27.4 percent in trade, 12.1 
percent in tourism and 5.3 percent in other services. De Haas (2003) concluded on the basis of 
his village-based survey that 60.1 percent of the total of non-real estate investments since 
1975 had been in non-agricultural business.  
 
It has been argued that recent international migrants exhibit different attitudes towards 
investment than did the lower educated, more traditionally oriented ‘guest worker’ generation, 
and that recent migrants and the second generation are more inclined towards investments 
outside agriculture in productive, lucrative and often urban sectors (Gallina, 2004; Kaioua, 
1999). Hnaka (1999, p. 165) refuted this hypothesis by arguing that recent migrants from the 
Sous were less interested in investing in general.10  
 
However, it is unlikely that changing investment priorities can be wholly attributed to inter-
generational differences in attitudes or structural economic transformations characterized by a 
decreasing relative importance of the agricultural sector compared with industry and, in 
particular, the service sectors. At least part of this intertemporal shift can be explained by the 
mere fact that migration is ‘maturing’, and therefore reflect the fact that investment priorities 
tend to shift over the life cycle. There is evidence of a relationship between migration duration 
and the sectoral allocation of migrants’ expenditure and investments. Heinemeijer et al. (1976, 
pp. 93-5) concluded that housing is generally the first major investment – besides direct life 
necessities such as food and medical care – once a certain amount of money has been saved. 
As we have seen, traditional economic activities in sending areas such as agriculture might 
temporarily stagnate or decline in the first years after migration. After this period, however, 
migrants tend to exhibit a diversifying tendency towards other types of investment, such as 
agriculture, small-scale industry and the service sector (Berriane, 1996; Refass, 1999).  
                                                 
10
 Ben Ali (1996, p. 354) observed that the propensity to invest among migrants in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium was higher than among migrants in France and Spain, although he did not analyze whether this reflects 
different circumstances in the country of origin or differences in the characteristics of the migrants. 
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De Haas (2003) identified a sequence in which real estate investments occur relatively early in 
the migration cycle and peak 5-14 years after initial migration, to stabilize at a high level. 
Major agricultural investments mostly occurred 15-24 years after migration and investments 
in non-agricultural private businesses peaked 25-29 years after migration. The relatively older 
international return migrants therefore had the highest inclination to invest in general and the 
highest monetary share (77.5 percent) in non-farm business investments — which seems to 
refute the hypothesis that there is a big inter-generational shift in investment priorities11.  
 
Previous research suggests that one of the very motivations to migrate is to enable the migrant 
to start his own enterprise upon return. Through its investment capital-generating function, 
migration makes possible the shift from a position of employee to the desired position of self-
employment (cf. Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 94; Kagermeier, 1997; Mezdour, 1993, p. 182). 
Berriane (1997) stressed the importance of transnational bonds between international migrants 
and family members who stayed in Morocco in explaining investments. This became apparent 
in the concern that migrants expressed for creating small-scale projects in trade or services in 
order to offer a job to their relatives, so that they could become financially independent.  
 
 
Investment leakage, regional disparities and intra-rural urbanization  
 
The duration of migration tends to coincide with an increasing diversification in both the 
sectoral and spatial allocation of investments. For instance, whereas first houses are generally 
constructed in the native village, second and subsequent houses are generally constructed in 
urban centres. Migrants tend to allocate commercial investments to housing, commerce and to 
agriculture outside the native village, especially when the latter offers few prospects of 
economic development.  
 
It is commonly argued that such leakage of migrants’ investments from the periphery to the 
large cities in West Morocco would further exacerbate the already large spatial rural-urban 
                                                 
11
 While extensive attention has been paid the role of return migrants in development, the role of migrants still 
abroad has been relatively neglected. This is rather strange, because these migrants send the bulk of remittances 
and their impact on local and regional development tends to be substantial. 
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economic disparities, which are said to subsequently accelerate the exode rurale (Aït Hamza, 
1988, p. 169; cf. Bijaad, 1987; Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. 53; Kaioua, 1999, p. 124; Naim, 
1997). Nevertheless, existing evidence strongly suggests that the majority of urban-based 
investments by migrants tend to be allocated in rapidly growing towns within regions of origin 
(De Haas, 2003; Refass, 1999). The relative arbitrariness of delimiting regions implies that 
judgment of migration impacts on spatial disparities is not unambiguous. This means that 
differences in the scale of analysis affect the assessment of migration impacts on regional 
inequality. For instance, restricting the analysis to the village level easily leads to the 
conclusion that many investments leak away to central urban areas. If we extend our scope to 
the regional level, the conclusion can be that most investments remain within the region and 
that migration has actually decreased inter-regional disparities with central regions located in 
Morocco’s economic heartland along the coastal Rabat-Casablanca axis.  
 
Thus, investment outside the native village or town does not necessarily mean investment 
outside the region. Even in the marginally located Todgha valley in south-Morocco, only 5.1 
percent of all houses and only 16.0 percent of all enterprises had been established outside the 
oasis. Nevertheless, 19.7 percent of all houses and 42.4 percent of all enterprises had been 
established in Tinghir, a boomtown located within the valley (De Haas, 2003). This illustrates 
the general process of rural urbanization taking place in Morocco, which is closely and 
reciprocally intertwined with processes of internal migration and international migrants’ 
investments in the urban sector. Although some returnees settle in central cities such as Rabat 
and Casablanca, the majority resettle in towns within or close to their native regions, thus 
combining the advantages of urban facilities and ethnic-linguistic closeness. 
 
The urban allocation of migrants’ investments and the fact that many return migrants prefer to 
resettle in towns in their native regions have spurred the development of new urban centres 
within or near to migrant-sending areas themselves (cf. Agoumy, 1988; De Haas, 2003; 
Lazaar, 1989). Numerous centrally located villages and small towns located within or near 
migrant-sending regions developed into medium-sized or large urban centres over the past few 
decades. Towns such as Tiznit, Agadir, Ouarzazate, Taza, Tétouan, Tangiers, and Oujda have 
experienced a dramatic and sometimes chaotic growth since the 1970s. Completely new 
towns, such as Nador and Al Hoceima in the Rif, Zagora in the Drâa valley, and the Kelâa 
Mgouna-Boumalne de Dadès cluster and Tinghir in the south, have sprung up from almost 
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nothing in just a few decades (Aït Hamza, 1999; Bounar, 1993; McMurray, 1992, cited in 
Nyberg-Sørensen 2004). Numerous smaller centres have developed around crossroads, 
markets and administrative centres, in a process of what has been called a “generalized micro-
urbanization” of the rural space (Berriane, 1996, p. 368, cf. El Maoula El Iraki, 1999). The 
proliferation of new urban centres has been accompanied by a slowdown in the growth of 
large cities (cf. Giubilaro, 1997, p. 35).  
 
Along with the general urbanisation process taking place in Morocco12 international migration 
is also increasingly becoming an urban phenomenon. Not only does an increasing share of 
migrants originate from towns, but return migrants also increasingly prefer resettling and 
investing in regional urban centres, due to the presence of public amenities (health care, 
schools, electricity), employment opportunities and the greater potential for investments 
(Berriane, 1996, p. 379-80). International migrants have constructed 75 to 80 per cent of 
recent houses in urban centres in the Rif and the south (Berriane, 1996, p. 368; de Haas, 2003, 
p. 322). 
 
Besides the presence of public services and economic opportunities, this phenomenon can be 
partly explained by the aforementioned preference among some migrants who are still abroad 
to transfer their nuclear households (i.e., spouse and children) to towns, in order to avoid 
conflicts with and material claims by the migrants’ extended families (Berriane, 1996; 1997; 
de Haas, 2003; De Mas, 1990) 
 
There also appears to be a certain selectivity in return migration, with particularly successful 
and wealthy return migrants favouring urban areas rather than their previous homes in often 
much smaller settlements in rural areas. Less successful migrants tend to return rather soon 
after migration and resettle in their native villages, since they lack the material and human 
capital and aspirations to invest in urban areas (Collyer, 2004; cf. Berriane, 1997; Kagermeier, 
1997).  
 
 
                                                 
12
 In 2000, 55.2 percent of the Moroccan population were living in an urban environment (cf. Fadloullah et al. 
2000:8,26). 
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Migration and education  
 
A study conducted in Tangiers revealed that educational facilities formed the primary motive 
for households to settle or resettle in the city and thus came before the quest for better living 
conditions and investment opportunities (Berriane, 1996, p. 376). This points to the important, 
but generally neglected impact of international migration on education. Two empirical studies 
that have addressed this issue came to the similar conclusion that — whereas international 
migration was not or only slightly selective for education — international migrants’ children 
were better educated and exhibited higher school enrolment rates than children from non-
migrant households (Bencherifa, 1996, pp. 418-9; de Haas, 2003, pp. 325-335). Furthermore, 
both studies indicated that this positive impact also applies to women and that international 
migration therefore plays an accelerating role in closing the gender gap in education. 
Remittance-enabled investments in the human capital of children may thus be another motive 
to relocate migrant households to towns with better educational facilities.  
 
 
Indirect economic effects and ‘reverse’ internal migration 
 
Through urban-based real estate and business investments, international migrant households 
simultaneously capitalize on, and actively contribute to, the accelerated urban growth and 
concentration of economic activities in existing urban centres and migrant boomtowns (cf. 
Berriane, 1997). This also allows for a more positive evaluation of migrants’ consumption. 
Provided that most goods and services are produced regionally or nationally, consumption and 
so-called non-productive investments in housing and the service sector can have beneficial 
income multiplier effects through stimulating the agricultural and service sectors and creating 
employment and income among non-migrants as well. Although there is no hard micro-level 
empirical evidence that can shed a more precise light on the economy-wide, indirect multiplier 
effects of remittance expenditure, there is circumstantial evidence which leads us to 
hypothesize that such positive effects are considerable (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000; Berriane, 
1997; Charef, 1986; de Haas, 2003; Testas, 2002).  
 
There is little doubt that urban-oriented consumption and investments by migrants and, in 
particular, the building fever have created a surge in the demand for labourers, particularly in 
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housing construction, which cannot be met locally or even regionally. Remittance-enabled 
investments in commercial agriculture in parts of the Sous and the Rif and some oases have 
created substantial employment for farm workers.  
 
The simultaneous occurrence of out-migration and investments has caused an increase in 
urban and rural wages. De Haas (2003) found that while, traditionally, sharecroppers used to 
retain 1/5 of the yield, they now retained on average 41 percent of the harvest. Although this 
has typically been evaluated as a negative migration impact, this wage increase is obviously 
beneficial for the non-migrant and internal migrant labourers. This also explains why towns 
located in migrant-sending areas have increasingly become destinations for internal migrants. 
The latter originate from marginally located villages within such regions, but increasingly 
come from more distant, comparatively poor regions with low rates of international migration 
participation.  
 
For instance, many construction and agricultural workers in towns and commercial agriculture 
in the Rif are immigrants from the Tafilalt and Drâa valley in the south (Berriane, 1996, pp. 
381-3; El Meskine, 1993). In oases with high emigration rates, workers are often immigrants 
from more mountainous villages or more marginal oases (de Haas, 2003; Saa, 1998). Similar 
patterns of ‘reverse’ internal migration towards regions of international out-migration have 
been described for the southwestern Sous (Bencherifa, 1996, p. 415). As early as the 1970s, 
Bonnet and Bossard (1973, pp. 19-20) described how remittances-enabled investments in 
commercial market gardening in the Sous area and subsequent increased labour demand had 
provoked immigration from other Moroccan regions.  
 
A common contention is that remittances fuel price inflation, especially of land and real estate 
(cf. Aït Hamza, 1988; Hamdouch et al., 1979), partially provoked by speculation (Agoumy, 
1988). Nevertheless, these studies fail to disentangle the role of remittances from other 
inflationary pressures and it is not specified whether this ‘inflation’ reflects a rise in the 
aggregate level of prices and a subsequent decline in the general value of money, or that the 
rise in land prices is rather the result of higher local demand for this particular fixed supply 
asset. Inflation has been rather low in Morocco over the past few decades. Local surges in land 
and real estate prices might indeed have been spurred by migrants’ investments, and have 
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affected the poor adversely, but they seem to be primarily a constituent part of a more general 
process of urbanization and the concomitant increasing scarcity of such assets. 
 
  
Migration, inequality and social change 
 
Migration has not only deeply affected regional economies, but has also changed the social 
face of communities. Migration is not only an attempt to secure better livelihoods, but also a 
clear avenue of upward social mobility. For instance, besides its economic and wellbeing 
value, the construction of a house is also an expression of the newly acquired social status. 
Likewise, the renovation or construction of mosques and hadj, the Muslim pilgrimage to 
Mecca, not only fulfills an intrinsic, religious function, but also adds to the social prestige of 
the migrants. Both internal and international migration have played a central role in the 
“landslide of social, political and economic changes” (Crawford, 2001, p. 21) rural Morocco 
is experiencing. Migration has also accelerated the breakdown of ancient socio-ethnic 
hierarchies in migrant-sending communities. In fact, in most of rural Morocco, migration has 
contributed to the creation of a new social stratification (Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xxii; Mter, 
1995), with international migrant households forming a new kind of “migration elite”. In 
many respects, the new socio-economic dividing line in Moroccan migrant-sending 
communities is now between households with and without international remittance income 
(De Haas, 2003).  
 
One might easily conclude on the basis of such observations that migration and remittances 
cause increasing intra-community inequality. However, there is an apparent absence of formal, 
statistical tests pertaining to the effect of migration on income inequality in Moroccan 
communities. We know from the literature that this impact is heterogeneous and highly 
contingent on migration selectivity and migration stage (cf. Jones, 1998). We should therefore 
be extremely prudent before jumping to conclusions that migration has increased inequality 
based on rather superficial observations.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to avoid romanticizing the past by acknowledging that traditional 
communities tended to be inherently unequal. For instance, in oases, with their caste-like 
socio-ethnic stratification, most people used to live in grinding poverty, while subaltern 
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(mostly Black) ethnic groups such as the haratin and ‘abid were often restricted to serfdom or 
slavery (De Haas, 2003). In essence, what has happened is that new forms of inequality, based 
mainly on access to monetary resources, which are to a considerable extent defined along lines 
of access to international migration, have been largely superimposed upon the traditional 
forms of structural, hereditary inequality based on kinship, complexion and land possession. 
The rise of new elite groups has gone in parallel with the demise of traditional elites. This 
exemplifies the ambiguity and subjectivity in judging whether such migration-induced shifts 
should be regarded as positive or negative.  
 
For many subaltern groups, migration literally constituted a liberation and has been their main 
avenue of upward socio-economic mobility. Migration and remittances have enabled the (at 
least partial) emancipation of individuals belonging to socially and ethnically subaltern 
groups. Throughout Morocco, migration has offered new opportunities to earn an external 
income independent of the constraints set by traditional peasant society. Formerly landless, 
and hence powerless, men now earn wages that allow them to buy land and gain increasing 
influence in local affairs (Crawford, 2001; Otte, 2000). In Moroccan oases, the haratin, a low-
status ethnic group, have been able to acquire a higher social status through their new 
financial resources (Ilahiane, 2001; cf. Bellakhdar et al., 1992; Ensel, 1999; Mter, 1995; 
Naim, 1997). These migration-induced shifting patterns or sometimes even reversal of social 
stratification explain why even individuals belonging to traditional high-status groups, who 
previously did not see the need to migrate, now aspire to emigrate abroad (McMurray, 2001).  
 
Consequently, members of formerly subaltern groups increasingly reject traditional 
authoritarian structures. They often refuse to work as sharecroppers or agricultural laborers for 
traditional elite groups (cf. Kerbout, 1990; De Haas, 1998). Consequently, traditional village 
councils (jemâas), the most important local political institutions, have lost much of their 
effective power to settle intra-community conflicts (Aït Hamza, 1988; Otte, 2000). The 
negative consequence for traditional agriculture can be that collective agricultural works, such 
as the maintenance of irrigation systems, are not carried out properly and that common law 
regulating land and water use is decreasingly respected (De Haas, 1998; Kerbout, 1990; Otte, 
2000). In particular, in fragile anthropogenic, labor-intensive agricultural systems, such as 
traditional oases and mountain terraces, the result might be a general decline of traditional 
agricultural systems and land degradation (cf. De Haas, 2001).  
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Migration and the position of women left behind   
 
Intra-household relations in Morocco tend to be based on strong patriarchal principles. This is 
manifested in the fact that only men have historically been allowed to migrate alone (cf. 
Crivello 2003)13. Traditionally, migrants leave their wives and daughters behind with their 
extended family, who protected their chastity. In this context, De Mas (1990) interpreted 
remittances destined for the entire extended family household as the literal price that the 
migrant pays for this control. In this way men were able to migrate without risking their 
families’ honor. However, nuclear family households have increasingly become the norm over 
the past decades.  
 
As we have seen, migration-related tensions on remittance use have played an accelerating 
role in the breakdown of extended families and have stimulated the lifting out of nuclear 
families and nucleation of family life. Besides increased divorce rates, migration is seen as a 
major cause of the increasing number of female-headed households in Morocco. Fadloullah et 
al. (2000, p. 130) found that the proportion of female-headed households among migrant 
households is almost double (15 versus 8 per cent) that among non-migrant households. De 
Haas (2003) concluded that, mainly because of migration, female-headed households 
accounted for one-third of all the households interviewed in his survey. 
 
The impact of migration on gender roles has received relatively scant attention, since most 
research focuses on the position of the — mostly male — migrants and interviews tend to be 
held with — supposedly male — ‘household heads’ (cf. Hajjarabi, 1995). The consequences 
of migration on women’s wellbeing are generally put in a negative light by predominantly 
male scholars, while the presumed lack of “paternal authority” is said to increase delinquency 
among youngsters (cf. Aït Hamza, 1995, p. 159,164; Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. 130). 
                                                 
13
 In particular since the 1990s more and more Moroccan women have migrated independently to work, in 
particularly to Italy and Spain (cf. Salih 2001). Although we have no room to deal with this issue in details, the 
impact of this feminisation of labour migratoin on gender roles in sending areas might potentially be important. 
By working abroad, women may enhance their roles as economic providers to the families left behind (Crivello 
2003). 
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However, these assertions tend to be based on general impressions rather than on systematic 
empirical inquiries. 
 
It is a common assertion that migration has encouraged the emancipation of women. In the 
absence of their husbands, women’s responsibilities, autonomy and power are said to increase 
(Aït Hamza, 1988; 1995; Bouzid, 1992; Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. xix,130). Nevertheless, a 
comparative study by Van Rooij (2000) among non-migrants’ and migrants’ wives refuted the 
hypothesis that migration contributes to changing gender roles. The lives of migrants’ wives 
remain largely confined to housekeeping, child-rearing and agricultural work (for similar 
results, see also Bouzid, 1992; Steinmann, 1993). Although they tend to have more control 
over the use of their husbands’ earnings and in child-rearing, this gain in authority was mainly 
temporary, since migrants resume their position as patriarchs as soon as they return (Van 
Rooij, 2000). Based on her fieldwork in Al Hoceima in the Rif area, Crivello (2003) stressed 
that women also frame their migration within a broader family project and within familiar 
social networks to garner approval and status. 
 
Since the material situation of wives of international migrants is better and more secure, they 
are generally able to hire non-migrant women and men for certain domestic and agricultural 
tasks (Aït Hamza, 1995, p. 165), easing their physical labor burden compared with other 
women (Steinmann, 1993; Van Rooij, 2000). Spouses of international migrants gain in power 
and status vis-à-vis non-migrant women. However, Steinmann (1993, p. 122) argued that the 
increasing emphasis on a capital-based economy and one-sided dependency on their 
husband’s remittances adversely affected women. Moreover, changes in gender roles are not 
necessarily positive. For instance, if women take over traditional ‘male’ tasks, such as 
harvesting as a result of migration, some of the younger men may refuse to work in what has 
now come to be dubbed ‘women’s work’ (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004, p. 10).  
 
Furthermore, the emotional burden of the increased responsibilities can be high. Both 
Hajjarabi (1995) and Van Rooij (2000) revealed that migrants’ wives do not necessarily 
appreciate the sudden increase in responsibilities and tasks, which were not theirs within the 
normative context of traditional society and to which they do not always aspire. As this new 
role is generally not assumed out of free choice, it should not automatically be equated with 
emancipation in the meaning of making independent and conscious choices against prevailing 
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norms on gender roles. Migration itself apparently has no direct influence or only a limited 
one on such norms, and gradual changes in these and the improving position of women 
therefore reflect general processes of cultural change within Moroccan society rather than the 
particular effect of migration14.  
 
However, there might be some more indirect positive effects as well. We have seen that 
international migration does have a distinct positive influence on the educational participation 
of migrants’ daughters and that remittances have both pushed and enabled migrants’ wives to 
establish independent households in newly-constructed houses for their nuclear family, 
thereby escaping control by in-laws and gaining in personal freedom. Furthermore, Courbage 
(1995) hypothesized that – besides factors such as higher age of marriage, increased female 
labor force participation and improved education – the migration of Moroccan families to 
European countries has contributed to the diffusion and adoption of European marriage 
patterns and small family norms, and so has played an accelerating role in the demographic 
transition (cf. Fargues, 2004).  
 
 
A culture of migration?  
 
International migration also has profoundly affected the social and cultural face of migrant-
sending regions. International migrants have become role models (Kerbout, 1990, p. 54). 
Their yearly massive return during summer holidays and exposure to the relative wealth of 
migrants and their direct relatives have increased the sense of relative deprivation and the 
aspirations of ‘stay-behinds’ (Aït Hamza, 1995). Migration has had an important influence on 
life rhythm and seasonality. Instead of the sowing and harvest seasons in autumn and spring, 
the July-August holiday season is now the yearly economic and cultural peak season, when 
markets are at their busiest and most marriage feasts take place (De Haas, 1998; 2003).  
 
                                                 
14
 Until recently women migrated almost exclusively in the context of family migration. However, it should be 
noted that, since the 1990s, a small, but increasing proportion of independent labor migrants to Europe and North 
America are female, which also seems to be the result of general cultural change.  
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After comparing Ghana, Senegal, Turkey and Egypt, Schoorl et al. (2000, p. xv) concluded 
that Morocco had the strongest migration tradition and that migration had become an “all-
pervasive phenomenon” in that country. The exposure to migrants’ wealth and status symbols 
is frequently said to have given rise to the emergence of a culture of migration, in which 
international migration is perceived as the main avenue of upwards socio-economic mobility 
(Fadloullah et al., 2000, pp. 132-46) and ambitions and life projects are generally situated 
elsewhere (Hajjarabi, 1988). For many youngsters, the question is not so much whether to 
migrate, as when and how to migrate. The hopes of many young non-migrants are focused on 
marriage with an international migrant as the most secure way of migrating abroad. 
 
Nevertheless, there is reason to criticize the uncritical way in which the culture of migration is 
often assumed to be ‘just’ there as a reified entity and the way in which this assumption is 
subsequently projected onto perceived realities. For instance, in a quantitative analysis of the 
role of migration culture and networks in perpetuating Moroccan migration, Heering et al. 
(2004) measured migration culture, which was included in their model as a dummy variable, 
simply by assuming that regions with established tradition of high international out-migration 
“had” a migration culture and regions without such a tradition did not have such a migration 
culture.  
 
Besides obvious measurement problems, the term ‘culture of migration’ itself can be 
misleading, since it suggests that rising aspirations and the outward-looking mentality are 
mainly the consequence of the exposure to the perceived success of migrants. It is important 
to recognize that migration itself is constituent part of a complex set of radical social, cultural 
and economic transformations that have affected Morocco, as well as an independent factor in 
perpetuating and probably intensifying, magnifying and accelerating these processes at the 
local and regional levels. Migration is not only a factor explaining change, but also an integral 
part of change itself to the same degree as it may reciprocally enable further change. Other 
processes, such as improved education, increasing exposure to electronic media, improved 
infrastructure and tourism also play a key role in opening people’s eyes to the wider world and 
helping to raise aspirations. Since these are part of more general and universal processes, 
‘culture of migration’ is perhaps not the most appropriate term to use.  
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The socio-cultural impacts of migration tend to receive a bad press. Migration is said to have 
caused people to disdain local wages and manual, particularly agricultural, labor, and thus led 
to agricultural decline (Bencherifa, 1991; De Haas, 1998; Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 88). It 
has often been hypothesized that, as a consequence of the migration culture, youngsters cannot 
imagine any local improvements through their own initiative and do not believe that they can 
build their future in Morocco (Schoorl et al., 2000, p. xvi). The ensuing passivity and 
unwillingness to work and invest is evaluated as being harmful to regional development. 
However, the empirical evidence presented above generally points to the contrary, since 
migration and remittances have led rather to increased local economic activities, although 
presumably not at levels sufficient to respond to the even faster increased aspirations.  
 
It has been commonly argued that migrants create an unrealistic perception of Europe as an El 
Dorado of almost unlimited opportunities (cf. Chattou, 1998, p. 236). Non-migrants are said 
to have exaggerated images of living in Europe through the media and the tendency among 
migrants to show off during holidays and to conceal failures. Although this is probably true to 
a certain extent, the simple fact that salaries in Europe easily exceed Moroccan salaries by five 
to ten times15, as well as the prospect of increased personal freedom and the access to public 
health care, schooling and social security do, however, seem to justify the strong desire to 
migrate. Even the prospect of becoming an undocumented migrant does not scare all people 
off. Prospective migrants are rightly optimistic about their chances of obtaining legal status, 
considering the fact that, over the past decades, a large proportion of previously 
undocumented Moroccan migrants have succeed in obtaining residence permits through 
legalization or marriage.16  
                                                 
15
 The typical salary of a day laborer doing unskilled work in Morocco is around 5-6 US$ per day. Even 
undocumented agricultural workers in the Spanish province of Andalusia earn about 26 US$ for an eight-hour 
day (Migration News, Vol. 7, No. 6, June 2000). Regular salaries in western and northern European countries 
tend to be significantly higher. The average agricultural and construction worker in the Netherlands earned a net 
salary of 106 and 133  per day in 2001, respectively. 
16
 A recent survey demonstrated that, among Moroccan migrant workers who reported illegal entry or overstay, 
the proportion reporting that they have been successful in their attempts to attain legal status is two-thirds or 
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Fadloullah et al. (2000, p. xxiii) stated that the migration culture can become “a collective 
psychosis [in which] the group becomes almost totally obsessed by the idea of leaving, at any 
price” [translation from French by author]. However, this seems to be a caricature. According 
to their own survey, 29 percent of men had the intention to emigrate, but only 3 percent had 
undertaken concrete steps in that direction. Moreover, the survey was conducted only in 
regions of high out-migration. International migration is a highly selective process, mainly 
occurring among specific sections of the population of 20-29-year olds (Schoorl et al., 2000). 
People do not want to leave at “any price”, and therefore only a minority turn intentions into 
action. Migration demands considerable and increasing costs and risks and is therefore 
generally a well-considered and well-prepared decision, in which family and community 
members are often heavily involved (cf. De Haas, 2003).  
 
In fact, the valuation of the strong desire to emigrate is an inherently normative affair. From 
one perspective, migration is as a vote of no-confidence which drains migrant-sending regions 
of valuable human resources. From another perspective, out-migration is the inevitable 
corollary of broader development processes, in which people’s horizons widen and their 
capabilities and aspirations increase. Such rising aspirations push people to exploit their 
talents, to become more productive and to increase their wellbeing. It would be naïve to 
assume that these aspirations could all be realized in the native village. In fact, migration 
allows for better factor productivity, and this seems to be the fundamental reason why 
economic and social development (e.g., improved education, information, income, 
infrastructure) is generally associated with increasing migration (cf. Skeldon, 1997).  
 
It would be unrealistic to think that young people would do better to stay to help the 
development of the sending area if we bear in mind the high unemployment and the lack of 
resources available to them. This very lack of certain capabilities largely disables them from 
‘developing themselves’, and it is particularly through international migration that these 
capabilities can be acquired. It is therefore a rational choice to migrate. Even if impressions of 
Europe are too rosy and despite the manifold problems migrants may face abroad, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
more (Heering and Van der Erf 2001:6; Schoorl et al. 2000:xix). Nevertheless, this figure is possibly biased, 
because of an overrepresentation of already legalized migrants.  
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perception that international migration is the most secure way towards more social and 
economic freedom is therefore more than a mirage. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Four decades of intensive international migration have fundamentally transformed sending 
communities, as well as Moroccan society in general. Migration has become an all-pervasive 
phenomenon that has also affected the perceptions and increasing aspirations of most people., 
An increasing number of studies since the 1990s have revealed the generally positive impacts 
of migration on development in Moroccan migrant-sending regions and the communities they 
contain. Migration has enabled households to invest in housing, agriculture, private 
enterprises and the education of male and female children. The relatively high and stable 
remittance income improves living standards of households. This generally seems to confirm 
the hypotheses of the new economics of labour migration. Nevertheless, because much 
empirical work is methodologically flawed or biased, more systematic empirical comparisons 
and analytical rigor are needed to formally test hypotheses on the effects of migration on 
marginal propensities to invest, intra-community inequality and the economy-wide income 
multiplier effects of remittance expenditure.  
 
However, there is substantial circumstantial evidence which leads us to hypothesize that 
migrants’ consumption and investments have stimulated the economies of migrant-sending 
regions as a whole, from which non-migrants and ‘reverse’ immigrants to emigration areas 
have indirectly profited through increased employment and income. Through household 
relocation and increasingly urban-based real estate and business investments, international 
migrant households simultaneously capitalize on, and actively contribute to, the accelerated 
urban growth and concentration of economic activities in urban centres mostly located inside 
or nearby migrant-sending areas.  
 
Although the remittance-induced construction of houses destined for nuclear families 
generally improves the wellbeing of migrants’ wives and remittances enable their daughters to 
go to school, migration hardly has the often assumed effect on changing norms on gender 
roles, which rather seem to reflect general processes of cultural change. There is substantial 
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evidence that migration has enabled the emancipation of formerly subaltern socio-ethnic 
groups to the detriment of ancient elite groups. This socially differentiated nature of migration 
impacts also exemplifies the inherently ambiguous and value-laden nature of migration impact 
assessments.  
 
Ultimately, differentiating valuations of migration impact are strongly related to 
differentiating a priori assumptions about what actually constitutes ‘development’. This is 
visible in the widely diverging opinions about how to evaluate migrants’ consumption and 
investment behavior as well as various processes of social change, such as the demise of 
traditional societies and extended families. The same applies to the culture of migration. 
Although this is generally negatively evaluated, because it tends to perpetuate emigration, it 
can also be positively interpreted as a highly developmental consequence of increasing the 
capabilities, aspirations and, hence, potential productivity of young people.  
 
This raises the more fundamental question of whether the more optimistic tone of recent 
migration impact studies reflects a veritable change in migration impacts over recent years, 
the use of better or other methodological and analytical tools, or the deductive echo of a 
general paradigm shift away from dependency to neo-classical and neo-developmentalist 
views on development and migration. It appears that all these factors have at least some 
explanatory value. Firstly, there is indeed evidence that impacts change over time and are 
partly contingent on the migration stage, and that positive effects become more apparent as 
migration matures. Secondly, the overall quality of migration studies has improved, leading to 
better and more subtle insights into the heterogeneous nature of migration impacts. Thirdly, 
general paradigm shifts have certainly played a role. Structuralist theory has become 
increasingly discredited, and this might have led to less negative interpretations of dependency 
and a more positive value being attributed to the global incorporation and capitalization of 
pre-modern peasant societies.  
 
The above analysis leads to the following three key observations. Firstly, whereas 
international migration and remittances have stimulated social and economic development in 
many migrant-sending regions, it is important to observe that this impact is fundamentally 
heterogeneous across space and time, as well as across socio-ethnic and gender groups. 
 37  
Notwithstanding the generally positive impact, some regions and some social groups can be 
adversely affected by migration.  
 
A second key observation is that, instead of a more or less predetermined impact, migration 
and remittances give migrants and their households the freedom to retreat from, just as much 
as to invest in, local economic activities. While remittances enable change in both directions, 
they do not determine the direction of this change as such. That is why neither the ‘migration 
optimists’ nor the ‘migration pessimists’ are right. Whether migration will trigger 
development or perhaps the reverse, is fundamentally contingent on the specific social, 
cultural and ecological context prevailing in migrant-sending areas, as well as on national and 
international factors, such as migration policies and political and economic conditions, 
prevailing in sending and receiving societies. This context will eventually determine the 
extent to which migrants tend to return, circulate, remit and invest, as well as the sectoral and 
spatial allocation of such activities. Prudence is therefore called for in making generalized 
statements on the alleged positive or negative impacts of migration. 
 
The third key observation is that there is ample evidence that the development potential of 
international migration for Moroccan sending communities is far from fully realized. 
Kagermeier (1997; 1999) was right in emphasising that many return migrants are not 
successful and that many investment projects fail. He questioned the dominant image of the 
successful return migrant, and argued that the high visibility of their often urban-based 
material investments create a bias obscuring the difficult life of many return migrants and 
their general failure to realize their initial dream of establishing their own enterprise. The fact 
that Moroccans have one of the lowest tendencies to return of all immigrant groups in Europe 
(Fadloullah et al., 2000, p. 56; de Haas 2006) seems to indicate that Morocco is indeed not the 
most attractive environment in which to live and invest.  
 
On the one hand, this might be partly related to the fact that many first generation migrants 
lack the financial means, education and cultural background to start innovative enterprises 
(Kagermeier, 1999, p. 205). On the other hand, the developmental potential of migration is not 
fully realized due to an unfavourable general development context characterized by 
inadequate infrastructure and the absence of public services, particularly in rural areas; failing 
credit and insurance markets; excessive red tape and corruption confronting potential 
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investors; difficulties in obtaining title deeds on property; inefficient judiciary and a lack of 
legal security; as well as a general lack of trust in government institutions and doubts about 
future political and economic stability (Bencherifa and Popp, 2000; de Haas, 2003; Gallina, 
2004; Kaioua, 1999). This might explain the generally prudent investment behaviour and the 
tendency to invest in relatively low-risk sectors, such as housing and retail trade.  
 
It is not realistic to expect a large-scale return on investments for as long as the state fails to 
create an attractive social, political, economic and institutional environment. In fact, the 
increasing involvement of migrants’ associations in Moroccan community development (cf. 
Lacroix 2005) can also be negatively interpreted as a response to the state’s failure to develop 
a proper institutional framework. Three decades ago, on the basis of the first comprehensive 
study on migration and development conducted in Morocco, Heinemeijer et al. (1976) argued 
that, although migrants exhibited a relatively high propensity to invest, the investment 
opportunities for migrants in their regions of origin were very limited. They therefore 
concluded that development in migrant-sending regions was a prerequisite for return and/or 
investment rather than a consequence of migration. This thoughtful observation has not lost 
any of its validity.  
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